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III.

Plaintiff-Appellee's
misstatements of fact.

ARGUMENT

brief

contains

several

material

Further, Plaintiff's key arguments side-

step the issues raised by Defendant-Appellant in his brief. Th6se
issues are addressed sequentially below.
A.

DEFENDANT'S JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT IS NOT LIMITED
TO QUESTION OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AS A
SIMPLE READING OF THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL ORDER
PROVES

At Paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 15, and 16 of PlaintiffsAppellee's brief, it is alleged and argued that the issue of
personal jurisdiction was not properly raised or preserved in the
trial court below, and that the trial court did not make any
decision regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction.

In fact,

Plaintiff even refused to address or argue the matter on the merits
to this Court in her Brief:
The lower court did not make a decision on the issue of
personal jurisdiction and therefore the Plaintiff does
not respond to Defendant's argument regarding the same as
set forth on pg. 15, subparagraph 4, of the Appellant's
Brief.... [Emphasis added].
Brief of Appellant at 15.
The simple truth is that the Order of Dismissal (R. 54-55),
which was "Approved as to Form and content" by Plaintiff's Counsel,
and then signed by Hon. James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court
Judge on January 24, 1997, and which is the "final judgment" giving
1

rise to this appeal, holds:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT
1. Defendant's Petition for Modification of the Divorce
Decree is

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter and

personal jurisdiction.

[Emphasis added1.

A copy of this document, from the official record, at R.54, is
attached to Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief as Exhibit A in the
Addendum, and is there hi-lited in yellow so that there is no
possibility of Plaintiff's further misunderstanding that this issue
of personal jurisdiction was indeed preserved and ruled on just as
much as was the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

B.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CONFUSES THE DOMESTICATING OF
BACK-SUPPORT JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY ENFORCEMENT WITH THE
DOMESTICATION OF HER ENTIRE DIVORCE DECREE IN THE LOWER
COURT.
Plaintiff reiterates, and cites cases, in support of a nonissue. Defendant does not maintain, and never has maintained, that
domestication of an enforcement order alone somehow transfers full
jurisdiction to the new venue.
In the instant case, Plaintiff could and should have limited
her foreign judgment transfer to the order she wishes enforced in
Utah, to wit: the Order After Hearing issued by the Superior Court
of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino on
April 2, 1996.

Instead, she filed the complete Judgment of
2

Dissolution, dated December 5, 1991.
Defendant's
difference."

point

here

is

not

"distinction

without

a

By domesticating all of the divorce, all of the

divorce is subject to re-opening, vacation, dismissal, and related
attack in accordance with U.C.A. §78-22a-2(3).
The mere fact that Plaintiff only seeks enforcement of one
point of the judgment does not limit Defendant's response to that
portion of the domesticated divorce which Plaintiff elects to
pursue.

C. MODIFICATION VS. REOPENING IS A DISTINCTION WITHOUT
A DIFFERENCE.
At Appellee's Brief, p. 12, Plaintiff appears to concede that
Defendant may "defend, enforce, satisfy, reopen, vacate, set aside,
or stay the judgment."

In the same breath Plaintiff denies that

Defendant can modify the alimony order.
to be unaffected

by whether

Both propositions appear

or not the entire Judgment of

Dissolution has been domesticated, or just the enforcement order
for alimony. But what is "modification" if not a "re-opening"? If
the modification seeks to eliminate alimony due to a material
change in circumstances, as in the instant case, is that not a
"vacating" of the prior order?
to get to that point?

Does it not require a "re-opening"

Is it not a "defense" to Plaintiff's

enforcement action that Defendant simply has no means or assets
3

left to pay alimony further?

Common sense and plain language

require words to be construed in a reasonable manner. To "modify"
is to "re-open", "vacate", "defend", etc.. Changed circumstance is
a valid affirmative defense and appropriate basis for counterpetition in an action to enforce an alimony judgment. Plaintiff's
admission that Defendant can "vacate" or "reopen" the alimony
issue, but cannot seek to "modify" it, makes no sense.

D. PLAINTIFF'S SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN UTAH WHICH
WAS ALSO AVAILABLE IN CALIFORNIA IS IRRELEVANT.
Plaintiff, at Appellee's Brief p. 16, attempts to argue that
she "did not seek additional affirmative relief in Utah that was
not already available to her in California" in transferring the
entire Judgment from California to Utah.
question.

This non-issue begs the

It is irrelevant that the remedies sought in Utah may

also have been available in California.
authority contra.

Plaintiff

cites no

The point remains that Plaintiff domesticated

the entire Judgment in Utah, thus subjecting the entire Judgment to
attack or modification in Utah, as argued in Appellant's Brief,
whether or not those remedies were also available in California.

E.

PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE ON RIMENSBURGER IS MISPLACED

Plaintiff relies on Rimensburger v. Rimensburger. 841 P.2d 709
(1992), to establish the proposition that a party wishing to modify
4

a divorce decree must do so in the original forum only.

However,

the facts of Rimensburger are far from the facts in the instant
case, and Rimensburger is therefore easily distinguishable and not
good precedent for the instant case.
Fundamental fact differences include (1) Rimensburger involves
two judicial districts in Utah, not two separate states where Full
Faith and Credit and related issues apply, and

(2) the party

wishing to modify in Rimensburger was not dealing with a case which
had been fully domesticated in Husband's new state.

It is one

thing to simply go to another venue and forum-shop, as Wife did in
Rimensburger.

It is another altogether to respond to a fully

domesticated case transfer when brought to one's own court in its
entirety and is subject to being treated in all respects "as a
judgment of the district court of Utah," (UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22a2(2)), as is the situation in the case at hand.

F.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S RELIANCE ON DATA MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS, INC., IS MISPLACED.
In her Brief at 13, Appellee relies on the case of Data
Management Systems, Inc., v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377 (Utah 1985)
for the proposition that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act does not
allow Utah courts to re-open or re-examine case from sister states
absent a showing of fraud or lack of jurisdiction or lack of due
process

in the rendering

state.
5

Once again, however, Data

Management Svstems Inc. does not involve a case where the entire
foreign case, not just a judgment or enforcement order, was fully
domesticated in Utah, as is the case here.

Plaintiff's case law

could be on point were the instant case merely an enforcement
action. The instant case is a fully domesticated case which now is
treated in all respects as a Utah judgment under

U.C.A. §78-22a-

2(3).

G.
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS DAY IN COURT IN THE
MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.
Plaintiff-Appellee proposed, at 14 and 15 of his Brief, that
Defendant received equal protection and due process because "he had
his day in court in the enforcement proceedings."

This analysis,

again, begs the question. The true issue is "should Defendant have
received his day in court to modify the California decree after the
entire

Judgment,

not

domesticated in Utah."

just

the

enforcement

order,

had

been

Again, Plaintiff lumps together two quite

separate status situations—one where Defendant responds to an
enforcement

order,

and

quite

another

domesticated her entire case in Utah.
authority and argument are misplaced.

6

where

Plaintiff

has

Thus Plaintiff-Appellee's

H. THIS IS A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION WHERE GOOD PUBLIC
POLICY SUPPORTS DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S POSITION
(a) The Trial Court Judge Confirms That This Is A Unique
Case and That Utah Law Should Be Clarified on the Issue

In Tr.(Dec.13,1996)at 10:5, counsel for Defendant-Appellant
stated that he'd like to certify the jurisdiction issues for an
appeal.

The trial court responded at 10:7-17:

If you'll submit the appropriate order, Counsel, I
will sign it. Because I think it's something that needs
to be clarified under Utah law.
Unfortunately, this case is unique on its facts, and
I'm surprised, frankly, that we haven't got anything
better [than MacLean].... And I've made a decision, and
if I'm wrong, we'll all learn from it. But that's the
order.
Thank you, counsel.

[Emphasis added].

Furthermore, in the Nov. 15, 1996 hearing, at Tr. 5:1, the
Court stated its reservations to Ex-Wife's assertions through
counsel that modification must be done in California, if at all:
I'm not sure, Counsel. It is a concern on my part
that I have never addressed. I don't know what the law
is on it,••••
It is clear that the Court, and no doubt lawyers, judges, and
7

litigants in Utah generally, could benefit from appellate review
and clarification of these seemingly contradictory principles—Full
Faith and Credit on the one hand, and access to Courts in a total
domestication of a foreign judgment on the other.

(b)

Good Public Policy Suggests That Residents of Utah

Not Be Foreclosed From Asserting Claims Arising Out Of
Foreign

Cases

Brought

to

Utah

Courts

And

Fully

Domesticated Here.
It is one thing to honor foreign decrees through the Full
Faith and Credit clause to the United States Constitution. No one
disputes that.
What Appellee disputes in his Brief is Appellant's proposition
that if an out-of-state party chooses to bring more than a mere
enforcement

order

into

a

Utah

court

through

whole-case

domestication, that Utah residents should not be barred from using
their own courts to argue issues arising from the same case the
out-of-state plaintiff chooses to wholly domesticate in Utah. Why
should Mrs. Bankler be permitted to litigate all parts of her case
in both California and Utah, while Mr. Bankler can only defend the
Utah case by travelling to California?

The logic of Utah law

accommodating everyone except Utah residents in Utah courts seems
flawed.

This is particularly

illogical when Mrs. Bankler, a
8

California resident, chose to domesticate her entire Judgment in
Utah.

Mr. Bankler did not choose to be pulled into additional

litigation anywhere. Once forced to defend, however, he is barred
from defending in that very court he is pulled into, and is told
that if he wishes to modify a fully domesticated Utah case he must
do so in California while his ex-wife advocates the same issues in
his home state of Utah.
In addition to the bad logic and fundamental unfairness, there
are policy concerns of judicial economy and financial burdens
inherent to parties in litigating the same issues in the several
states. Refusal to permit the issues to be tried together in Utah
where the moving party consents, and defending party resides, does
not seem like a sound policy.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff-Appellee's

Brief

("Mrs.

Bankler")

does

not

accurately and fully respond to the issues raised in this appeal.
The most obvious evasion involves Mrs. Bankler's blatant assertion
that the trial court did not address the issue of personal
jurisdiction and that Defendant-Appellant failed to preserve it on
appeal, when in fact the Order of Dismissal—the final judgment
appealed

from

herein—unequivocally

states

that

"Defendant's

Modification of the Divorce Decree jls dismissed for lack of subject
9

matter

and

personal

jurisdiction.

It

is

a

fact

that

all

significant issues, including jurisdiction, have been preserved,
despite Mrs. Bankler1s assertions contra.
Perhaps the most significant side-stepping of Mrs. Bankler1s
responsive brief involves her continued
exactly was domesticated in Utah.

misconstruction of what

She chose to domesticate her

entire Judgment dated December 5, 1991, not just the enforcement
order dated April 2, 1996. She also sought additional relief here.
All of the key points in her brief miss this fundamental and
significant point.

Even if her cases and authority support the

domestication of an enforcement order, they do not support the
proposition that Mr. Bankler should be barred from asserting
defenses or modifications after Mrs. Bankler chose to domesticate
the entire Judgment in Utah.

Thus her reliance on the cases and

statutes she cites do not address the key issues Mr. Bankler raises
on appeal.
Finally, good public policy supports allowing Mr. Bankler to
seek modification of his spousal support order in the Utah court,
due to changed circumstances now that Mrs. Bankler has forced him
into court after domesticating her entire Judgment of Dissolution
in Utah.

As this appears to be a case unique on the facts and

perhaps of first impression, as the trial court suggested, the
parties are entitled to clear guidance from the appellate courts.
10

Mr. Bankler should be entitled to the affirmative relief he seeks—
access to his own court to modify the support order after Mrs.
Bankler has (1) consented to that court and (2) has pulled him into
that court against his will by domesticating her entire foreign
Judgment of Dissolution.
It is respectfully requested that the Court of Appeals reverse
the district court's denial of Mr. Bankler!s right to assert his
petition to modify the divorce decree now domesticated in Utah and
which is, or should be, subject to the same respect as any other
Utah judgment.
Respectfully submitted this

^

day of ^

1997.
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
day of November, 1997,
I do hereby certify that on the u
the
above and foregoing
I mailed two true and correct copies of
ft
DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by placing same in the United States Mail,
first-class postage prepaid, to the following, to wit:
Ronald L. Read
HUGHES & READ
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770

TA/£> J&?f£F&
'
,
///^^J^Vf3^
^

HUNTSMAN
for Defendant
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Attachment A:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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WASHINGTON CO UNTY
!
BY ____

-U

PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN - 5677
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
283 West Hilton Drive - Ste. #3
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-2846
Fax No.: (801) 628-3049
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
DORENA BANKLER,

]I

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

;

JACK BANKLER,
Defendant.

]I

Civil No.

966500506

Defendant having petitioned the Court for an Order Modifying
the

Decree

Plaintiff's

of

Divorce; this matter

Motion

to

Dismiss

came

on Monday,

on

for hearing on

December

9,

1996.

Plaintiff did not appear but was represented by counsel, Ronald L.
Read.

Defendant appeared and was represented by counsel Paul R.

Christensen.

Both parties having submitted Memoranda and oral

argument was given.

The following Order is hereby entered by the

Court:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1.

Defendant's Petition for Modification of the Divorce

Decree is DISMISSED

for lack of subject matter and personal
1

jurisdiction.
2.

The Court has jurisdiction to give full faith and credit

to the Judgment entered by the California Superior Court which has
been domesticated in the above-entitled Court.
Dated this

2 ^f

day of

J(X ^

, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

Ronald L. Read
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY HAND DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that on the 24th day of January, 1997, I
delivered, by hand, a true and correct unsigned copy of the above
and foregoing STIPULATION AND ORDER OF CONTINUANCE to the
following, to wit:
Ronald L. Read
HUGHES & READ
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 8477 0

Paul R. Christensen
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
2

I do hereby certify that on the
day of
, 1997, I mailed a true and correct signed copy of the above and
foregoing STIPULATION AND ORDER OF CONTINUANCE by placing same in
the United States Mail, first-class postage pre-paid, to the
following, to wit:
Ronald L. Read
HUGHES & READ
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770

Paul R. Christensen
Attorney for Defendant
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